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Conclusions,
The Dysfunctional Board
The directors
were not willing to take any blame for Enrons failures.
All thirteen of the directors interviewed by the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations explained they had reasonably
relied on assurances provided by Enron management, Andersen
(the accountant/auditor), and Vinson & Elkins (Enrons
law firm), and had met their obligation to provide reasonable
oversight of company operations.
The five
Board witnesses rejected any share of responsibility for Enrons
collapse. John Duncan, former Executive Committee Chairman,
testified the problem at Enron was that Enron management did
not tell the truth. He argued that both management
and Andersen personnel were well aware of the problems
facing the company and they did not tell us. (Hearings,
p.21 )
Mr. Winokur,
former head of the Finance Committee, testified that Enron
was a cautionary reminder of the limits of a directors
role which is by nature a part-time job.
(p.22) He argued further: We cannot, I submit, be criticized
for failing to address or remedy problems that have been concealed
from us. (p.23)
The Staff
Report argued, however,
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much of what was wrong at Enron was not concealed from
its Board of Directors. High-risk accounting practices,
extensive undisclosed off-the-books transactions, inappropriate
conflict of interest transactions, and excessive compensation
plans were known to and authorized by the Board.
The
Subcommittee investigation did not substantiate the
claims that the Enron Board members challenged management
and asked tough questions. Instead, the investigation
found a Board that routinely relied on Enron management
and Andersen representations with little or no effort
to verify the information provided, that readily approved
new business ventures and complex transactions, and
that exercised weak oversight of company operations.
The investigation also identified a number of financial
ties between Board members and Enron which, collectively,
raise questions about Board member independence and
willingness to challenge management.
The
failure of any Enron Board member to accept any degree
of personal responsibility for Enrons collapse
is a telling indicator of the Boards failure to
recognize its fiduciary obligations to set the companys
overall strategic direction, oversee management, and
ensure responsible financial reporting.
At
the hearing, the Subcommittee identified more than a
dozen red flags that should have caused the Enron Board
to ask hard questions, examine Enron policies, and consider
changing course. Those red flags were not heeded. In
too many instances, by going along with questionable
practices and relying on management and auditor representations,
the Enron Board failed to provide the prudent oversight
and checks and balances that its fiduciary obligations
required and a company like Enron needed. By failing
to provide sufficient oversight and restraint to stop
management excess, the Enron Board contributed to the
companys collapse and bears a share of the responsibility
for it. (Staff Report, beginning on p.11)
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Remember the findings of the Subcommittee (discussed
in Enron
the Company)? Have the Senators found the time to
ask questions about all of these issues?
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