Conclusions, The Dysfunctional Board

The directors were not willing to take any blame for Enron’s failures. All thirteen of the directors interviewed by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations explained they had reasonably relied on assurances provided by Enron management, Andersen (the accountant/auditor), and Vinson & Elkins (Enron’s law firm), and had met their obligation to provide reasonable oversight of company operations.

The five Board witnesses rejected any share of responsibility for Enron’s collapse. John Duncan, former Executive Committee Chairman, testified the problem at Enron was that Enron management did not “tell the truth.” He argued that both management and Andersen personnel “were well aware of the problems facing the company and they did not tell us.” (Hearings, p.21 )

Mr. Winokur, former head of the Finance Committee, testified that Enron was “a cautionary reminder of the limits of a director’s role” which is by nature a “part-time job.” (p.22) He argued further: “We cannot, I submit, be criticized for failing to address or remedy problems that have been concealed from us.” (p.23)

The Staff Report argued, however,

… much of what was wrong at Enron was not concealed from its Board of Directors. High-risk accounting practices, extensive undisclosed off-the-books transactions, inappropriate conflict of interest transactions, and excessive compensation plans were known to and authorized by the Board.

The Subcommittee investigation did not substantiate the claims that the Enron Board members challenged management and asked tough questions. Instead, the investigation found a Board that routinely relied on Enron management and Andersen representations with little or no effort to verify the information provided, that readily approved new business ventures and complex transactions, and that exercised weak oversight of company operations. The investigation also identified a number of financial ties between Board members and Enron which, collectively, raise questions about Board member independence and willingness to challenge management.

The failure of any Enron Board member to accept any degree of personal responsibility for Enron’s collapse is a telling indicator of the Board’s failure to recognize its fiduciary obligations to set the company’s overall strategic direction, oversee management, and ensure responsible financial reporting.

At the hearing, the Subcommittee identified more than a dozen red flags that should have caused the Enron Board to ask hard questions, examine Enron policies, and consider changing course. Those red flags were not heeded. In too many instances, by going along with questionable practices and relying on management and auditor representations, the Enron Board failed to provide the prudent oversight and checks and balances that its fiduciary obligations required and a company like Enron needed. By failing to provide sufficient oversight and restraint to stop management excess, the Enron Board contributed to the company’s collapse and bears a share of the responsibility for it.” (Staff Report, beginning on p.11)


Remember the “findings” of the Subcommittee (discussed in “Enron the Company”)? Have the Senators found the time to ask questions about all of these issues?