Nikkei
Financial Daily, p.9, 06/25/01
Translated
Article:
Pioneer
of Corporate Governance
Bob
Monks, A Record of Struggle (Part I)
Bob Monks (67), the man who has changed the course of
corporate governance in the US, has been battling on the frontlines long
before shareholders of large US pension funds like CalPERS became
active. As attention is focused on
shareholders’ rights with the approaching season for annual shareholder
meetings in Japan, we retrace the path of Mr. Monks’ career in American corporate
governance.
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The
right to vote the stock is part of property, an asset
The
Myner’s Report is a plan for reform commissioned by the UK government to be
written by Paul Myners, director of a British asset management company. This plan, presented to the government in
March of 2001, analyzes the financial market from various viewpoints. The plan points out the need for British
institutional investors to take part in the management of the companies in
which they invest as shareholders.
The
British government, which has decided to support the Myner’s Report, has
begun the legislation reform process, and Monks is assisting the various
parties involved. He does not
hesitate to point out that the policy the British are trying to adopt is
actually the law that he himself wrote 15 years ago in the US.
From
1984-85, Monks was a president-appointed official in charge of the Labor
Department office for pension funds. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which is
considered to be the constitution of pension fund management, serves as the
basis for his radical view that it is the obligation of the trustee to
prudently administer the vote asset for shareholders.
Monks
has held various positions as a lawyer, venture capitalist, and top financial
executive. His experience in
Washington’s political world helped him attain his post in the US Department
of Labor. “With the help of many
staff we developed a line of analysis that was very sound and has been
recognized as being correct ever since then. And the line was this: a
trustee is responsible for enhancing the value of trust property,” says
Monks. “What is trust property? The right to vote the stock is property,
it’s an asset. Therefore it’s the
obligation of the trustee to administer the vote asset.”
-
The
necessity of government participation
It is
widely acknowledged that the 1974 passing of ERISA changed the world of
pension fund management, but it was Monks’ relentless pursuit of trustee
accountability in the mid-80’s that truly advanced corporate governance in
the US. Monks points out the
importance of active government involvement in propelling corporate
governance. “It was a matter of
having the support of the principle officers of the agency and developing a
coherent and correct interpretation of the law,” he says.
During
his time at the Department of Labor, Monks further attacked the lack of
transparency in investment management. He began investigations into “soft dollar” services—research services
offered by securities firms, free of charge to investors. There was a danger that in exchange for
such free services, pension funds would buy and sell stocks from these
securities firms for expensive fees. It was Monks’ belief that if a supervising government office would
take an aggressive position to control such situations, that would rouse
attention among the parties involved and result in the elimination of soft
dollar.
Monks
prepared suits against large financial institutions for violating ERISA
though ultimately they were stymied by opposition from the Attorney General. But Monks was to leave the Labor
Department after just one year. This
was during the pro-business, republican Reagan era and Monks confesses, “if I
had stayed much longer, I may well have called more attention to myself and
my work might have been rejected.” He
explains that he resigned because he feared harming the future of the
corporate governance movement.
-
Founding
ISS, leaving ISS
Even
after leaving the Department of Labor, Monks’ determination to advance
corporate governance did not wane. In
1985 he founded Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a consulting
company that provides analysis and advice to institutional investors, on
issues voted on at shareholder meetings. Monks explains, “you couldn’t expect a trustee to spend an enormous amount
of money, informing himself about the issues involved in voting every stock
held in an account. So we needed to
have some way that the trustees could efficiently be voting stock.”
Unfortunately
at that time, ERISA’s principle that voting the stock was an institutional
investor’s duty, was not yet clearly explained and therefore ISS encountered
some difficulty in acquiring clients.What changed the flow of things was a statement released by the
Department of Labor in February of 1988, commonly known as the “Avon
Letter.”This statement made it
officially clear that pension fund trustees have an obligation to vote their
stock.The man who wrote out this
statement was a confidant of Monks’ who worked under him during his time at
the Labor Department.
After it
became officially recognized that institutional investors had an obligation
to shareholders to vote, the number of ISS clients jumped dramatically. The client list came to include such big
names as CalPERS, Fidelity, TIAA-CREF, and General Motors.
Yet as
managing ISS began to run smoothly on its rails in 1990, Monks decided to
leave the company to start a new endeavor to push corporate governance
further, this time as a shareholder himself.
[New York, Tetsuji Santazono]
Part
II