UNDERSTANDING PENSION FUND CORPORATE ENGAGEMENT IN A GLOBAL ARENA

Oxford – November 2002

Session Four
Legal Regimes and their Impact on Corporate Engagement

How do national laws shape the kinds of engagement that can occur? Can corporate engagement using internal levers of power accomplish broad socially optimal outcomes more effectively than outside pressure groups and state-level regulation?

  

The failure of the United States and United Kingdom governments to enforce the law of trusts respecting the conflicting interests of institutional investors has effectively warped the scope of corporate engagement. The pension funds of private companies, the largest and most experienced component of the category, do not participate in corporate activism. Perhaps the most experienced observer of the sub industry in the United States, James E. Heard, now CEO of Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), “is not aware of a single corporate pension fund that has become a governance activist.” [Fortune, Marc Gunther, 22 June 2002]. This severe skewing of the pension fund universe has several consequences. Because only a fraction of the total institutional investor universe actually practices “engagement”, their activity inevitably is trivialized. Because the private company pension funds are allowed not to participate, the existing activity can be dismissed as the concern of theoreticians and of those without enough experience of real business to be worth listening to. While the participants are respected institutions, they are not The President and Fellows of Harvard College, the Ford Foundation, The Trustees of the Wellcome Trust or of Cambridge University. The “great and the good” are not players in either country.  

There are several explanations for their inactivity. Certainly the most persuasive explanation is that they face a huge conflict of interest. They are hired by corporate executives to manage the pension assets. If they take an aggressive approach with any portfolio company’s management, then they probably won’t be retained to manage their assets for very long. Indeed, it is unlikely that they would be hired to manage any firm’s assets. I have attached a chart entitled “The Golden Rule” which shows the pervasive circular logic through which private pension assets are in effect removed from engagement participation. A fiduciary wishing to “engage” runs the risk of virtually certain competitive reprisal. Until and unless such a fiduciary can explain to his superiors and his customers that he is only doing what is plainly required by law and that all other companies similarly situated (his competitors and potential competitors) have no choice but to do the same thing, such action will not be rational.  

By and large, the fiduciaries of private company pension plans are conglomerate financial organizations which have (or want to have) multiple relationships with the companies showing shares they hold in pension portfolio. With respect to U.S. pension funds, ERISA requires as plainly as the language permits that plan assets be administered exclusively for the benefit of plan participants. (Emphasis added). Enforcement of this precept of law clearly would require rearrangement of existing and hugely profitable commercial alignments. The U.S. Department of Labor declines to enforce this law and the United Kingdom has recently deferred full implementation of the Myners Report, which plainly required institutional activism. What has resulted is that only those institutions without conflict of interest can participate in the engagement process in both countries. Many choose not to do so. 

This is, in fact, a very short list. The Public Employees’ Retirement System of California, the pension funds for the City of New York and the College Retirement Equity Fund in the United States and Hermes and the Universities Superannuation Scheme in the United Kingdom have provided the preponderance of activity. 

There are many ways in which the law could be enforced with respect to conflicting interests without requiring massive institutional rearrangement. Special purposes entities could be created or responsibility could be selectively delegated. An example is the delegation by Hewlett Packard board member Patricia Dunn of the voting responsibility of Barclay’s Global Asset Management, of which she is Chief Executive officer, to an independent fiduciary in the recent contested merger vote with Compaq. 

The portion of law in each country conferring power on shareholders importantly informs the scope of engagement policy and practice. Some overgeneralization may be helpful. Only in the United Kingdom do shareholders enjoy real power to influence management. Under The Companies Act, ten percent of the shareholders of a UK company may call an Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”) at which any or all of the directors may be removed with or without cause. Because of the homogeneity of UK financial institutions, this means that any one of perhaps forty institutions has it within their power actually to change the management of companies of all sizes. Shareholders are not conferred this power under the laws of any of the United States. Ownership power is limited to exhortation and “name and shame”. Because of the actual ability of shareholders of UK companies to require “engagement”, it is possible that corporations chartered there will assume a different – and possibly more competitive character – than those chartered elsewhere. 

The ethical responsibility of corporations is spacious compliance with law and the adoption of practices to insure its integrity. This includes full public disclosure of the impact of corporate functioning on society and the avoidance of corrupting the law making and enforcement processes. That corporations’ ethical concerns should be fully circumscribed by compliance with law is a compelling proposition first articulated by David Engel in 32 Stanford Law Review 1 (1979). Democratic societies very carefully limit how and to whom they confer power to impact the lives of citizens. One certainly needs to question what authority corporations have to make judgments affecting the circumstances – environmental, for example – under which we live. I, for one, have not consented to Exxon determining the quality of the air I breathe.

Robert A.G. Monks